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A company, as a separate legal personality, is not able to act on its own 
accord. It must necessarily participate in legal transactions through 
natural persons acting on its behalf.1 Directors are the persons who act 
on behalf of the company in transactions with third parties. Their 
functions and responsibilities arise by virtue of the company as being a 
separate legal personality. 
The company acts through its organs. One of its organs is the 
board of directors, which is entrusted with the management of the 
business of the company. The other organ, through which a company 
acts, is the general meeting of the company, which is not the object of 
this study. 
The management of a company can only be effective if the directors 
are empowered with sufficient discretion to exercise their powers in an 
effective and efficient manner. However, it is also important that 
members of the company in its general meeting exercise effective 
oversight over the management of the company by the directors. It is, 
however, not easy for members to exercise judicious control over 
management because of the diversity and dispersal of shareholders. 
Hence, directors are subject to various duties, which are normally 
classified as the duty of care and skill, and the fiduciary duties. The 
effective control of the directors is dependent on the enforcement of 
these duties, which are based on common law. These common law 
                                           
1 Celliers & Benade Corporate Law, p 3 
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duties have, however, been supplemented by duties derived from 
statutory law.2 
2. Directors and self-dealing  
The focus of this study is on the fiduciary duties of directors, in 
particular the duty to avoid conflict of interests with regard to self-
dealing in contracts of the company. Self-dealing occurs when a director 
is simultaneously a buyer and seller for and on behalf of the company in 
the same transaction. The position of the common on law on fiduciary 
duties has always been that such a situation was untenable.3The rule 
against self-dealing requires directors not to act on behalf of the 
company in a matter in which they have an interest.4 The rule is strictly 
applied by our courts. This study does not deal with other situations of 
conflict of interests, such as exploitation of corporate opportunity by 
directors, misuse of company information and unlawful competition 
with the company. 
 The study analyzes the origin and development of the common law 
fiduciary duties of directors in South Africa and how company 
legislation has impacted and modified them through the various 
companies’ acts. The law of fiduciary duties has existed for centuries as 
a fundamental principle underlying various disciplines, ie the law of 
agency, trust law, etc.5 
Chapter 2 considers the origin and basis of the fiduciary duties of 
directors in South Africa; initially as it emerged from Roman-Dutch law 
and later, from English common law. It also examines the basis on 
which liability for breach of fiduciary duties has been determined. 
                                           
2 Havenga M Fiduciary Duties of Directors (PhD thesis), p 1 
3 Shepherd J C The Law of Fiduciaries, p 145  
4Cohen v Directors of Rand Colliers Ltd 1906 TS 197 
5 Ibid p 2 
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Up until the enactment of the 1926 Companies Act, the fiduciary 
duties of directors were regulated exclusively by the common law. 
Chapter 3 deals with the intervention of the Legislature in this area of 
company law. It assesses the extent to which two major amendments 
effected by the 1939 Companies Amendment Act and the 1952 
Companies Act modified the common law. Both amendments were 
preceded by the investigation of company law by commissions of 
inquiry.   
Chapter 4 examines the review of the company law undertaken by 
the Van Wyk De Vries Commission and the 1973 Companies Act, which 
was a product of the work of the Commission.  
Lastly, Chapter 5 assesses the major changes brought about by the 
2008 Companies Act with regard to the fiduciary duties of directors, 
especially in regard to the duty to avoid a conflict of interests with 
respect to self-dealing. More importantly, it assesses the potential 
impact of the new approach inaugurated by the Act, ie the disclose and 
recuse approach. 
3. Methodology 
The methodology that the study follows is historical. At the outset, the 
origin and basis of the fiduciary duties owned by directors to their 
company is considered. Specific attention is given to the situation where 
a director has been involved in self-dealing with the company. Currently, 
South African company law is largely based on English law, which has 
been influential in the development of our company law. However, in the 
early development of company law, our courts also relied on the Roman-
Dutch law.  
 Furthermore, the study examines the development of the company 
law through legislative interventions, which were preceded by 
8 
 
commissions of inquiry that investigated the law in the light of 























Directors’ Fiduciary Duties Prior to 1926 
1. Introduction 
When the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910, the main sources 
of company law were the common law and the various pieces of 
company legislation which existed in the provinces. The provincial 
statutes, which were based on English company law, remained in force 
until 1926 when the first national Companies Act was passed.6 Since 
the nineteenth century, English company law has dominated our 
company law. Its dominance has almost obliterated the influence of 
Roman-Dutch Law, which was alive in the nineteenth century and at the 
turn of the twentieth century as reflected in the law reports of the time.7 
2. The Cape under the rule of the VOC 
The arrival of Jan van Riebeeck in 1652 marked, not only the beginning 
of the story of modern South Africa, but also the reception of Roman-
Dutch law. On 7 April 1652, van Riebeeck formally took possession of 
the Cape for the Vereenigde Geoctroyeerde Oost-Indische Campagnie 
(VOC), the Dutch East India Company. The Cape was subjected to the 
rule of the VOC for a period of 150 years. Economic life was strictly 
supervised and controlled by the company. The company decided what 
occupations the settlers were to undertake by issuing licensing for such 
activities.8 Under the rule of the company there was no trias politica 
(separation of powers) as executive, legislative and judicial functions 
were exercised solely by it.  
                                           
6 Mongolo T Corporate Law and Corporate Governance, p 3 
7 Blackman MS The Fiduciary Doctrine and Its Application to Directors of Companies 
(PhD thesis), p 244 
8 Hahlo and Kahn The Union of South Africa: The Development of its Laws and 
Constitution, p 11 
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 The decline of the Dutch Republic during the eighteenth century 
saw a decline of its trading companies. In 1794, the once rich and 
powerful VOC had to declare that it was insolvent. Its charter was 
cancelled in 1795. 9 The demise of the VOC coincided with the 
occupation of the Cape by the British Empire in 1795.  
3. Evolution of South African Law under the British Rule  
Except for a brief period between 1803 and 1806, British rule lasted 
from 1795 until 1910. The British government retained Roman-Dutch 
law as the common law in South Africa, and this was affirmed in the 
First and Second Charters of Justice of 1827 and 1832 respectively. 
From the Cape, the Roman-Dutch law spread to the Transvaal, Orange 
Free State and Natal. Despite the retention of Roman-Dutch law, there 
was a general tendency to receive English law and institutions.10 
 The first company legislation adopted by the Cape was the Joint 
Stock Companies’ Limited Liability Act, 1861,11 which was based on the 
English Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 and the Limited Liability Act 
of 1855. The Companies Act of 1892,12 which regulated company law in 
the Cape until it was repealed by the Companies Act of 1926,13 took en 
bloc the provisions of its English counterpart which were in force in 
1890. The early Cape company statutes set the pattern for the Boer 
Republics and Natal.14However, many judges in the Cape kept Roman-
Dutch law alive.15 
 In the Transvaal, the Volksraad in 1849 confirmed in article 31 of 
its Thirty-three Articles that Roman-Dutch law was the basis of the law 
                                           
9 Hahlo and Kahn The South African Legal System and its Background, p 541 
10 Ibid p 461 
11 Act No 23 of 1861 
12 Act No 25 of 1892 
13 Act No 46 of 1926 
14 Hahlo and Kahn The South African Legal System and its Background, p 561 
15 Ibid p 562 
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of the Republic in so far as it was not in conflict with legislation.16  In 
the Orange Free State, the 1854 Grondwet provided in article 57 that, in 
the absence of legislation by the Volksraad, Roman-Dutch law was the 
basic law of the state. The courts in the Transvaal and Orange Free 
State did not consider themselves strictly bound to follow Roman-Dutch 
writers, but freely referred to and followed continental writers, English 
law, Scottish law, and even American writers. Moreover, Cape cases 
were referred to and followed in many judgments. The result was that 
both in the Transvaal and Orange Free State it was not the pure Roman-
Dutch law of jurists such as Grotius and Voet which reigned supreme.17 
 In regard to company legislation, a similar process of borrowing 
took place. In the Transvaal, the Transvaal Law No 5 of 1874 followed 
very closely the Cape Act, No 23 of 1861. Similarly in 1909, the 
Transvaal enacted the Transvaal Companies Act of 1909 which was a 
copy of the British Consolidated Act of 1908, with few changes and 
additions to suit local conditions.18 
 Early company legislation in the Orange Free State, though 
allowing for limited liability, was less sophisticated until Law No 2 of 
1892 and Chapter 100 of the Law Book were promulgated, which 
followed the English Acts.19  
After the annexation of the Transvaal by the British, the 
Administration of Justice Proclamation of 1902 stipulated that ‘except in 
so far as it is modified by legislative enactments Roman-Dutch law shall 
be the law of this Colony’.20 Similarly with the annexation of the Orange 
Free State, the Laws Settlement and Interpretation Ordinance of 1902 
                                           
16 Hahlo and Kahn The Union of South Africa: The Development of its Laws and 
Constitution, p 21 
17 Ibid p 577 
18 Wille and Millin Mercantile Law of South Africa, p 226 
19 Ibid p 32 
20 Ibid p 220 
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and the General Law Amendment Ordinance of 1902 of the Orange Free 
State stipulated that ‘Roman-Dutch law shall be the common law of the 
Colony in so far as it has been introduced into, and is applicable to 
South Africa’.21 
 In Natal, Ordinance No 12 of 1845 enacted that ‘the system, code 
or body of law commonly called Roman-Dutch law, as the same has 
been and is accepted, and administered by the legal tribunals of the 
Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, shall be established as the law, for the 
time being of the District of Natal’. 22Natal was in sentiment and 
composition the most English of the colonies in South Africa, and 
imported many English rules of law, both indirectly through the Cape 
and directly from England. Its company law, the Joint Stock Company’s 
Liability Law 10 of 1864, however, followed very closely the Joint Stock 
Company’s Liability Act of 1861 of the Cape.23 
 The focus of this chapter is on the common law fiduciary duty of 
company directors to avoid conflict of interests, in particular the duty to 
avoid self-dealing and to disclose interests in contracts with the 
company. Subsequent chapters deal with the impact of the various 
Companies Acts on this duty. 
4. The Origins of Directors’ Fiduciary Duties 
In common law, directors are fiduciaries who stand in a fiduciary 
relationship to the company. In the seminal Robinson case, Innes CJ 
defines a fiduciary relationship thus: ‘Where one man stands to another 
in a position of confidence involving a duty to protect the interest of that 
other...’24 This relationship imposes an obligation on directors to act in 
good faith towards the company, to exercise their powers for its benefit 
                                           
21 Ibid p 221 
22 Ibid p 224 
23 Ibid p 225 
24 Robinson v Randfontein Estate Gold Mining Co 1921 AD 177 
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and to avoid a conflict or possible conflict between their own interests 
and their duty to the company.25 
 Two characteristics are therefore required to prove the existence of 
a fiduciary relationship. In the first instance, the fiduciary must have 
authority and scope to exercise discretion or power. Secondly, the 
fiduciary must be able to unilaterally exercise that power so as to affect 
the interest of the beneficiary in a legal and practical sense.26 
The fiduciary relationship arises from the purpose for which a 
director is entrusted with his office. He and his co-directors are 
entrusted with powers to manage the affairs of the company. It seeks to 
ensure that those powers are exercised only for the benefit of the 
company as a whole, and never for personal gain. The purpose of this 
principle is articulated by Innes CJ in Robinson as follows: 
‘It prevents an agent from properly entering into any transaction 
which would cause his interest and his duty to clash. If employed 
to buy, he cannot sell his own property; if employed to sell, he 
cannot buy his own property; nor can he make any profit from his 
agency save the agreed remuneration; all such profits belong not 
to him, but to his principal’.27 
The fiduciary duties of directors primarily protect the company and its 
shareholder. But they also protect the public interest, which is served by 
the integrity with which companies are conducted.  
                                           
25 Williams Concise Corporate Law, p 85 
26 Robinson v Randfontein Estate Gold Mining Co 1921 AD 177 
27 Ibid p 178 
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 Although our courts have for the most part relied on English law 
when developing our common law on fiduciary duties of directors, the 
doctrine also has Roman-Dutch law origins.28 
5. The Basis of Directors’ Fiduciary Duties in Roman-Dutch Law 
According to Blackman, in Roman-Dutch law the term ‘fiduciary duty’ is 
frequently used in connection with the administration of one person’s 
affairs by another person. The manner in which it is used can be seen in 
the judgement of Innes CJ in Robinson where he says:  
‘The principle underlies an extensive field of legal relationships. A 
guardian to his ward, a solicitor to his client, an agent to his 
principal affords examples of persons occupying such positions. 
As pointed out in Aberdeen Company v Blaikie Bros, the doctrine 
is to be found in civil law (D18.1. 34.7.) and must of necessity 
form part of every civilised system of jurisprudence’.29 
Blackman notes that of interest in connection with the fiduciary duties 
of directors are the rules prohibiting a tutor from concluding 
transactions with his pupil unless they are concluded with the consent 
of co-tutors or at a public auction. The existence of these rules is proof 
that Roman-Dutch law acted on similar considerations as the courts of 
Chancery.30 
 Referring to a statement by Voet about a sale entered into between 
a tutor and his pupil, Solomon JA said: ‘...an agent is put on the same 
footing as a tutor, the reason, no doubt being that each of them stands 
in a fiduciary relation, the former to his principal, and the latter to his 
                                           
28 Blackman MS The Fiduciary Doctrine and Its Application to Directors of Companies 
(PhD Thesis), p 245 
29 Robinson v Randfontein Estate Gold Mining Co 1921 AD 178 
30 Blackman MS Fiduciary Doctrine and Its Application to Directors of Companies (PhD 
Thesis), p 338 
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pupil’.31 Thus the rule prohibiting a tutor from transacting with his 
pupil was extended by analogy to all those administering the affairs of 
others. This process of extending fiduciary obligations by analogy is 
similar to the processes which took place in English law, in which the 
fiduciary duties of trustees were extended by analogy to agents and, 
subsequently, to directors of companies.32 
 The fiduciary duties regarding the administration of affairs of 
others serve, among others, three functions which are similar to those 
found in equity. They prohibit self-dealing, require disclosure of 
interests in transactions with the beneficiary and render voidable such 
transaction at the election of the beneficiary. The effect of these fiduciary 
duties in Roman-Dutch law was to: 
• hold an administrator accountable for any profit should he, 
without his beneficiary’s prior consent, advance his own interest 
at the expense of the beneficiary; 
• require the administrator to deal openly and in good faith with his 
beneficiary, should he wish to transact with him, by disclosing 
any relevant information concerning the transaction which he had 
acquired in his capacity as a fiduciary; and  
• render voidable transactions entered into by the fiduciary on 
behalf of his beneficiary in which he had a personal interest. 
The consequences of a breach of a fiduciary duty applied also to 
transactions entered into by the fiduciary with a third party who was 
                                           
31 Hargreaves v Andrews (1915) AD 522 
32 Robinson v Randfontein Estate Gold Mining Co 1921 AD 289 
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aware at the time of the transaction of the fiduciary’s interest in the 
transaction.33 
These rules were applied by our courts in a number of cases from 
the middle of the nineteenth century to the turn of the twentieth 
century.  
One of the early cases which dealt with agents who had personal 
interests in a transaction with their principal was Forbes, Still & Co v 
Sutherland.34 In this case two agents undertook to sell certain coal for 
the plaintiff on a commission basis. They approached and agreed with 
the defendant that they would become joint buyers with him of the coal. 
The defendant knew that the agents were acting on behalf of the 
plaintiff. In his judgement, Bell J said: ‘When a commissioned agent has 
property entrusted to his care, he is bound to give his principal every 
benefit of his skill and information in regard to its disposal, to hold 
himself entirely aloof from any advantage other than the commission.’35 
In his judgment, he relied on Story’s Equity Jurisprudence, an American 
writer. He further states that ‘the same doctrine is found in Voet’.36 In a 
concurring judgment, Watermeyer J, relying exclusively on Roman-
Dutch authorities, states the rule as follows: 
‘The relation of principal and factor (agent) is of a fiduciary nature, 
and demands the utmost protection of the court. It is a clear rule 
of modern law, adopted from the civil law, that an agent for the 
purpose of sale cannot purchase his principal’s goods – an agent 
cannot for the purchase himself be the seller...The principle is not 
alone in the civil law that the tutor, procurator, or factor cannot 
                                           
33 Blackman MS Fiduciary Doctrine and Its Application to Directors of Companies (PhD 
Thesis), p. 361 
34 (1856) 2 Searle 231 
35 Forbes, Still & Co v Sutherland(1856) (C) 2 Searle 236 
36 Ibid p 236 
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purchase directly; but it is neque per se neque per interpositam 
personam; neither directly or indirectly.’37 
The rule articulated in Forbes, Still & Co was accepted and applied, 
thirty years later, by the Appellate Division in Hargreaves v Anderson.38 
In Hargreaves, the plaintiff, Anderson, employed the defendant as his 
agent to sell a certain hotel property. The property was to be sold on 
terms agreed upon between the principal and the agent. The defendant 
sold the property, ostensibly to a certain Barlow, but he had already 
agreed with Barlow that the property would be sold to a joint 
partnership in which the defendant would take a half share in it. 
Thereafter, the principal adopted the sale but refused to pay the 
commission to the agent on the ground that the agent had acted both as 
seller and buyer at the same time or had a personal interest in the 
purchase which he had not disclosed. The court, as per Solomon JA, re-
stated the rule in Forbes, Still & Co in the following terms: 
‘Now it is clear law, both in this country and in England, that an 
agent, employed to sell, cannot legally purchase the property 
entrusted to him for sale, and that his principal, on discovery of 
the fact, is entitled to repudiate the sale. This is a settled rule 
which is quite independent of fraud, or of the fact that the agent 
has gained any advantage by the transaction. Nor does it make 
any difference whether the agent is the sole purchaser or is jointly 
interested with others in the purchase. The rule is, however, 
subject to this qualification that, if the seller with full knowledge 
of the facts elects to adopt the sale to the agent, it then becomes 
binding upon him. It is scarcely necessary to quote authorities in 
support of these well established principles…’39 
                                           
37 Ibid p 238 - 239 




Furthermore, the Forbes, Still & Co case recognised into our law the 
exception admitted in Roman-Dutch law that a purchase by tutor which 
was made openly and in good faith with either the consent of the co-
tutor or at a public action was valid. The exception was referred to and 
applied in Osry v Hirsch, Loubser & Co40, where the principal gave 
feathers to an agent. The agent purchased the feathers for himself at an 
auction and thereafter resold them at a profit. The agent did not inform 
the principal that he was the purchaser of the goods at the auction. The 
principal discovered that subsequently. The agent put up the defence 
that his conduct fell within one of the exceptions granted in Roman-
Dutch law that a tutor (by extension an agent) is at liberty to buy his 
pupil’s property at an auction in the open market.  
Kotze JP noted that “...the passage generally relied on in support 
of the rule that an agent, instructed to sell the property of his principal, 
cannot himself become the purchaser thereof is in Digest, 18. 1. 34. 7, 
where the jurist Paulus observed “A tutor is not able to buy the property 
of his pupil. The same principle should be extended to similar instances, 
that is to say curators, procurators, and those who administer the 
affairs of others.”...Ulpian states that, although a tutor cannot, as such, 
be the seller and purchaser at the same time, he may in good faith 
purchase his pupil’s property with the consent of his co-tutor...Ulpian 
adds that, if a creditor sells the pupil’s property, the tutor can equally in 
good faith become a purchaser.’41 
6. The Basis of Directors’ Fiduciary Duties in English Law 
Since the turn of the last century, English law has come to play a 
dominant role in our company law, including on the fiduciary duties of 
directors. The rules of equity pertaining to fiduciary duties have been 
                                           
40 Osry v Hirsch, Loubser & Co1922 (CPD) 548 
41 Ibid p 559 
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largely accepted into our law, and to the extent that they are not in 
conflict or inconsistent with our law. It has generally been accepted that 
directors owe a fiduciary duty to the company, however, there was at the 
beginning uncertainty regarding the exact basis of these duties. The 
courts of equity sought to base them on the position of director as either 
trustee or agent.42 
 The director stands, from the point of view of the company, in the 
position of one person administering the affairs of another. As we have 
seen in the case of Roman-Dutch law, the rules relating to such persons 
were developed and extended by a process of analogy. The rules 
formulated for one species of administrator were adapted and applied to 
others. In English law a similar process took place. 
In general, the directors of a company have two functions in law. 
They administer the company’s assets and represent it in transactions 
with third parties. As a result, the English courts have used the 
analogies of trustee and agent.43 These analogies are examined below. 
6.1 The Director as Trustee 
The rules of courts of equity required that persons such as directors be 
placed in a relationship of confidence to the company; that is as a type 
of trustee. In 1742, the directors of a Charitable Corporation were found 
guilty of breaches of trust, for which they had to account to their 
corporation.44 It has since been often stated that directors are trustees 
and that the nature of their duties can be explained on that basis.  
There are various explanations for how this analogy arose. One 
explanation has been that before 1844 most of the joint-stock 
companies in England were unincorporated and therefore dependent for 
                                           
42 Havenga M Fiduciary Duties of Directors (PhD Thesis),  p 11 
43 Ibid p 12 
44 Ibid p 11 
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the validity their acts on a deed of settlement which vested the property 
of the company in trustees. The deed of settlement was merely an 
enlarged partnership, with the partnership property vested in trustees. 
Thus, frequently the directors were trustees. It was therefore not 
unnatural that the courts extended the description of trustees to 
directors by analogy.  In the In re: Lands Allotment Co45case the court 
explained the analogy as follows: 
‘Although directors are not, properly speaking, trustees, yet they 
have been considered and treated as trustees of money which 
comes to their hands, or which is actually under their control, and 
ever since joint-stock companies were invented directors have 
been held liable to make good monies which they have misapplied, 
upon the same footing as if they were trustees...’ 
In dealing with the duties of directors, the court in the In re: City 
Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd46 case made the following remarks:  
‘...It has sometimes been said that directors are trustees. If this 
means no more than that directors in the performance of their 
duties stand in a fiduciary relationship to the company the 
statement is true enough. But if the statement is meant to be an 
indication by way of analogy of what those duties are, it appears 
wholly misleading. I can see but little resemblance between the 
duties of a director and the duties of a trustee of a will or of a 
marriage settlement.’ 
It was believed that the property of a corporation was held on trust by 
the corporation for its members. Since it was the directors who managed 
the property, they would, in English law, be held liable as constructive 
trustees if they misapplied the property. It is important to note that in 
                                           
45 Ibid p 12 
46 Hahlo’s South African Company Law: Through Cases – A Source Book, p 379 
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South African law the doctrine of a constructive trust has never been 
recognised.  
 Another explanation for the use of the trust analogy was that the 
courts of equity, in general, applied the description of trustee to anyone 
occupying a fiduciary position. The terminology gradually became 
standard in cases where any fiduciary obligation was considered. Since 
the flexibility of the principles of fiduciary obligation had proved 
adequate to deal with problems that have arisen in company law, the 
court found it convenient to find the liability of company directors on the 
principles of trust law.  
 The influence of the English principles of the law of trust and 
equity is apparent in early South African cases dealing with company 
directors. One of these cases is African Claim and Land Co Ltd v 
Landerman47 where Innes CJ said the following: 
‘(T)he duties and liabilities of an agent to his principal have been 
very fully investigated by the English courts, upon principles 
recognised by our law. And the position of a director who sells his 
own property to his company without disclosing his interest 
therein has been held liable by decisions of the courts, the results 
of which we are fully justified in adopting.’ 
This legal position on directors was endorsed in Robinson v Randfontein 
Estate Gold Mining Co Ltd48 when Innes CJ said ‘The doctrine of the 
English decisions was adopted by the Transvaal court in African Claim 
and Land Co as being in accordance with principles of our law; and I 
think we should also adopt it.’ 
 A company director is evidently in a position of trust. He is 
responsible for the administration of the company’s assets; similar to a 
                                           
47 African Claims and Land Co Ltd (1905) TS 505 
48 Robinson v Randfontein Estate G.M. Co Ltd (1921) AD 180 
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trustee who administers trust assets. There are many similarities 
between company directors and trustees. One of them is that they are 
both in control of a fund in which others are beneficially interested. A 
trustee must be honest and adhere strictly to the terms of the trust 
instrument. For the director, company law requires him to be also 
honest and act within the terms of his authority and the company’s 
constitution.  
 There are, however, clear differences between directors and 
trustees. An important distinction is that trustees are required to act 
unanimously, whilst a board of directors act by a quorum and the vote 
of a majority.  
Another difference is that directors are allowed a much greater 
degree of discretion and to take more risks with company property than 
are trustees who are entrusted with trust property. Courts are not 
willing to intervene in the exercise of directors’ discretion as business 
persons. They are not concerned with the commercial or financial 
wisdom of the decisions taken by directors of companies. 49 In the case 
of trusts, trustees are required to exercise caution and avoid risks.  
Finally, the beneficiary on the trust-analogy is, in the case of 
directors, the company itself as a separate legal entity. In a trust, the 
beneficiaries are persons, or a person, and the trust is not a separate 
legal entity.   
In conclusion, it may be inferred from the above that the 
designation of directors as trustees is inappropriate.50 Fiduciary 
obligations are not imposed on directors because they are trustees but 
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because they occupy an office similar to that of trustees, and they are 
relied upon to administer property belonging to others.  
6.2 The Director as Agent  
 The law, for some purposes, treats the directors as if they are agents. A 
company, as a separate legal personality, is unable to act on its own 
accord. It must act through natural persons acting on its behalf. 51 This 
position of directors was stated in the English case of Ferguson v 
Wilson52 thus: 
 ‘What is the position of directors of a public company? They are 
mere agents of a company. The company itself cannot act in its 
own person, for it has no person; it can only act through directors, 
and the case is, as regards those directors, merely the ordinary 
case of principal and agent. Wherever an agent is liable those 
directors would be liable; where the liability would attach to the 
principal and the principal only, the liability is the liability of the 
company.’ 
 Directors represent the company in transaction with third parties. Their 
acts are acts of the company. Their power to act on behalf of the 
company arises from and is limited by the authority conferred on them 
by the articles of association.  When they contract on behalf of the 
company, they do not incur any liability unless they act beyond their 
powers or expressly assume liability. The relationship of the company 
and its directors is in many ways regulated by the law of agency. For 
this reason, directors are frequently referred to as agents of the 
company.53 
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The idea of directors as agents was popular until the beginning of 
the twentieth century. Before then, the directors were subject to the 
control of the general meeting of the company because this body was 
seen as the company.54 At the turn of that century, the principle 
emerged that if the powers of management were vested in the directors 
then they alone could exercise those powers. It became common to 
entrust the management of the company’s affairs to the directors. The 
general meeting retained the right to remove directors at any time and to 
amend the articles. However, it may not direct or control the board in its 
management of the company’s affairs, nor overrule any decision which 
the board may have made in the conduct of the company’s affairs.55  
However, since the company is itself incapable of acting and 
cannot confer authority on someone else to act on its behalf, its 
directors cannot strictly speaking be regarded as agents. Directors 
cannot act as a principal and at the same time also grant to themselves 
the authority to act as agents. Their authority as such is derived from 
the articles, not from any appointment as agents by the company.  
Furthermore, each director does not individually have the 
authority to bind the company unless he is specifically delegated to do 
so.56 But a director, as an individual, is subject to fiduciary duties in 
relation to the company. In addition, the powers of directors are much 
wider than those usually conferred on agents and are often subject to 
little control by their principal. Unlike agents, directors are sometimes 
subject to criminal and civil liability for failing to comply with statutory 
requirements.57 
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56 Wolpert v Uitzigt (Pty) Ltd (1961) 2 SA 257 (W) 262 
57 Williams RC Concise Corporate Law, p 82 - 83 
25 
 
It is evident from the above that directors of companies are more 
than mere agents of their companies. Their position is sui generis.58 
 
7. The Duty to Avoid Conflicts of Interest 
Directors have a duty not to place themselves in a position where their 
duty to act in the best interests of the company conflicts, or may 
possibly conflict, with their personal interests.59 This rule was stated by 
Innes CJ in Robinson.60 He was following the ninetieth century English 
case of Aberdeen v Blaikie.61 An obvious example of a conflict of interest 
situation is where a director transacts with his company, ie as director 
sells his personal property to the company or buys property from the 
company. The general principle is that where a company enters into a 
contract in which a director has a personal interest the contract is not 
void but voidable at the election of the company. There are two 
important exceptions to this general rule. The first exception is that a 
director who breached his duty to avoid a conflict of interests may have 
it ratified by an ordinary resolution passed by the general meeting after 
full disclosure.62 The second exception is that the company’s articles 
may contain a clause which allows directors to have interests in 
contracts entered into by the company. Where the articles make for 
such a provision, they are effectively modifying, in advance, the 
directors’ fiduciary duty.  
7.1 Prohibition against Self-dealing 
The duty to avoid self-dealing applies to transactions entered into by the 
director on behalf of the company, whether he enters into such 
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transactions with himself or with a third party, and where he has a 
personal interest in its outcome. A director may therefore not act on 
behalf of the company in a matter in which he has an interest that 
conflicts or may possibly conflict with his duty to the company. This rule 
against self-dealing is applied by the courts in an inflexible and harsh 
manner in order to prevent fraud being perpetrated against 
companies.63  
 In African Claims and Land Co the issue was whether the sale by 
the director of his own property to the company was a breach of his 
fiduciary duty.64The articles of the company required a director to 
abstain from voting on contracts of the company in which he has an 
interest and to disclose the nature of his interest at the meeting at 
which the contract was determined. The articles did not require the 
defended, as a director, not to prospect in minerals in his personal 
capacity, which was the field in which the company operated. In 
addition, they did not require the director to devote the whole of his time 
to the business of the company, which is usually the case with 
managing directors or chief executive officers.    
A third party bought 200 claims and gave a half share of those 
claims to the employee of the company. The employee, in turn, sold to 
the director a half share of his interest; which gave the director a 25 per 
cent interest in the 200 claim. Subsequently, the third party reached an 
agreement with the company to sell the 200 claims. The director was 
aware of these negotiations and the agreement reached with his 
company.  However, he was not at the meeting which ratified the 
agreement. It was in the process of contracting with the third party that 
the company discovered that the director had an interest in the contract 
which he did not disclose to the company. The company took the 
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position that it was not possible to rescind the contract but it wanted to 
claim any profits made by the director on the transaction. Regarding the 
fact that the defendant was a director and whether the facts render him 
liable the court said: 
‘An ordinary director is a mandatory, entrusted, in conjunction 
with his co-directors, with the management of the company’ 
affairs; bound to exercise the utmost good faith in transacting 
with them; to give the company the benefit of his judgement and 
experience; and to render that amount of diligence which an 
ordinary, prudent and careful man would display under the 
circumstances. These things are expected of a director when 
acting as the company’s agent. But he is not always acting so. 
Save when a special or general authority is given to him to 
represent the company, he only acts in the management of its 
affairs jointly with his co-directors.’65 
The court held that at the time that the director acquired the property 
he was not in a fiduciary relation with the company. He was not legally 
obliged to obtain the property for the company. But it was a breach of 
duty to sell to his company without making a full disclosure of his 
interest in the claims. 
The principle enunciated with regard to directors in African Claims 
and Land Co was followed in Robinson, which is a seminal case in South 
African case law on the fiduciary duties of directors.66 In Robinson, the 
issue for decision was similar to the one in African Claims and Land Co. 
It was whether the director was in a fiduciary position to the company 
when he both acquired and later sold property to the company, and if he 
was, whether he could be made to account for profits he made from the 
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property. In order to succeed in a claim for profit, something more than 
a non-disclosure is required. The director must have stood as a fiduciary 
both at the time of purchase of the property and at the time of its resale 
to the company.  
The director had bought property which he later sold to the 
company at a profit. The director caused the company to create a trust 
whose sole purpose was to acquire the property. The court found that 
the trust was created by the director solely as a device to hide his 
dealing with the company. The director did not have a formally 
expressed authority to represent the company. However, after the 
director had bought out his former co-promoters of the company and 
had it restructured, the court found that he had assumed a de facto 
control of the company and had an implied mandate to represent and 
protect the interest of the company during the negotiations and 
acquisition of the property. He had assumed, with the acquiescence of 
the other directors, the functions of the board in respect of the 
acquisition of the property. Therefore, he stood in a fiduciary 
relationship to the company during the acquisition of the property and 
at the time he sold it to the company.  
Solomon JA, in his concurring judgement, referred with approval 
to the Transvaal Cold Storage Co Ltd v Palmer67and the African Claims 
and Lands Co cases in which the law was laid down. The principal in 
such circumstances was entitled to be put in the position he would have 
been in had the agent properly discharged his duty. He was liable to 
restore to the company the profit that he made out of the transaction.  
7.2 Disclosure of Interests in Contracts with the Company 
There is, however, an exception to the rule prohibiting self-dealing. The 
exception permits a director to enter into a contract in which he has an 
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interest, but only if he obtains the consent of the company in a general 
meeting after making full disclosure of the nature and extent interest of 
his interest. The director must in those circumstances, in relation to the 
contract, entirely sever his relationship with the company and deal with 
it at arm’s-length.  
This was held to be the rule in Magnus Diamond Mining Syndicate 
v MacDonald and Hawthorne.68 In this case the directors, who were also 
managers, were sued by the company on the grounds that they had 
appropriated information and property for themselves instead of the 
company. It was alleged that they acquired the property in breach of 
their duty as directors and managers of the company. In the 
negotiations for the acquisition of the property they represented to the 
sellers that they were acting on behalf of the company. And as managers 
and directors they were subject to all the responsibilities and liabilities 
of directors in similar conditions. Maasdorp CJ said:  
‘The case therefore resolved itself into the question as to what 
were the duties of the defendants, as such managers and 
directors. Now there can be no doubt that one of their first duties 
as directors, to use the words of Lindley on Companies (6th ed. Vol. 
1, p.510) was to “so conduct the business of the company, as to 
obtain for the benefit of the shareholders the greatest advantages 
that could be obtained consistently with the trust reposed upon 
them by the shareholders,” and do therefore their utmost to 
obtain the Welgegund property upon the most favourable terms 
possible under the existing circumstances.’69 
The court found that instead of seeking to secure the property for their 
company, the directors sought to acquire it for themselves. It stated that 
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the general principle of our law was that a person, who occupies a 
fiduciary position, was bound by law to act in good faith towards the 
company in whose service he was employed as a manager or director. 
The court pointed out that this rule has been elucidated by many 
weighty and valuable decisions in South African courts as well as in 
English courts. It said that one of the first rules laid down by our courts 
was that a director may not in any matter connected with the company 
place himself in a position where his interest and his duty conflict. The 
court referred, approvingly, to the judgment of Lord Cranworth in 
Aberdeen Railway Co v Blaikie Bros70, which said:  
‘(Director) he will not be allowed to enter into engagements, in 
which he has or can have a personal interest conflicting, which 
may possibly conflict, with the interests of those whom he is 
bound to protect. So strictly is this principle adhered to, that no 
question is allowed to be raised as to the fairness or unfairness of 
a contract so entered into.’ 
The exception to the rule against self-dealing insists that if a director 
desires not to be bound by this rule, he must make a full disclosure of 
the exact nature and extent of his interest to the company, and that the 
company must consent to him engaging himself in a matter in which the 
company has an interest. This exception was succinctly stated by Innes 
CJ in Robinson thus:  
‘There is only one way by which such transactions can be 
validated, and that is by the free consent of the principal following 
upon a full disclosure by the agent. In such a case the special 
relationship quoad that transaction falls away and the parties deal 
with at arm’s-length with one another.’71 
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Alternatively, the articles may relax the rules of disclosure, but they 
cannot waive the duty of directors to make a full disclosure to the 
company. The articles may permit disclosure to be made to the other 
directors at the level of the board. In order to obtain the protection of 
any provision in the articles, the board must be independent. In 
Robinson the defendant had claimed that he had disclosed his interest 
in the property which the company had sought to acquire to the board. 
The court, as per Innes CJ, said that ‘(a) disclosure to a board of 
directors entirely subservient to the defendant is not a disclosure such 
as would be necessary under article 74 in order to validate a sale of 
property made by him to it.’72 Furthermore, the director must strictly 
comply with the provisions of the articles on disclosure.  
 Failure to make a full disclosure in terms of the articles render the 
transaction voidable at the election of the company as against the 
director or third party who had knowledge of the breach of duty by the 
director. 
 In this regard, there was a difference between the Transvaal and 
the Cape. The clause generally inserted in the articles, and which was 
adopted in Table A, clause 95, of the Transvaal Act, allowed a director to 
make a contract with his company provided that he fully disclosed to the 
board of directors his interest in the contract, but was not permitted to 
vote on the matter. In the Cape, Table A, clause 56 provided that a 
director must vacate his office if he participates in the profits of any 
contract with the company, unless he was merely a member of a 
company contracting with the company of which he was a director. In 
the latter case, he was prohibited from voting on the contract.73 
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The existence of fiduciary duties for directors of companies has been 
recognised for centuries in Roman-Dutch law and English law, and for 
over a century in South African law.  
In general, it is recognised that a director stands in a fiduciary 
relationship to the company. In order to determine the content of his 
obligation, his position was often compared to that of other fiduciaries. 
The most frequently used analogies were those of agent or trustee, but, 
legally, directors are neither trustees nor agents of the company. 
In South African law a director is regarded as a creature of 
statute, who occupies a position which is peculiar to his office. It has 
been on that basis that a director’s liability for breach of trust is seen as 
sui generis. In Robinson, Solomon JA reiterated that ‘the action indeed 










                                           




Directors’ Fiduciary Duties after the 1926 Act 
1. Introduction 
In 1923, the South African government introduced a comprehensive 
Companies Bill in the Union Parliament.75 When introducing the Bill, 
the then Minister of Justice informed Parliament that ‘the Bill is largely 
based on the English Act and upon the Transvaal Act of 1909, which in 
itself was based on the English Act.’76 The English Act referred to by the 
Minister was the Companies Act passed by the British Parliament in 
1908.77 The reason given by the Minister for basing the legislation on 
the Transvaal Act was that it was the most modern legislation on the 
subject in South Africa. 
The Parliament passed the Companies Bill in 1926, which became 
the Companies Act, No. 46 of 1926, which for the first time provided a 
uniform company law throughout the Union. At the time of enactment, 
the Act did not modify the common law with regard to the fiduciary 
duties of directors, including with respect to directors contracting with 
the company. 
In the year the Act was passed, the British Board of Trade 
appointed a committee to consider and report on what amendments 
were necessary in the British Companies Act of 1908. The 
recommendations of the committee led to the passing of the Companies 
Act of 1929 by the British Parliament. The developments in company 
activity in the early years of the twentieth century were so rapid that by 
1926 the Transvaal Act of 1909 was already out of date.78 
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The Companies Act was, for the first time, substantially amended 
by the Companies Amendment Act, No 23 of 1939 (the 1939 Act). 
Further substantial amendments were made to the Act by the 
Companies Amendment Act, No 46 of 1952 (the 1952 Act). 
In this chapter, my treatment of the subject of the principal Act of 
1926 will be referred to as the Act and the references given are to the 
sections of the Act as amended.  
2. Reform of the common law fiduciary duties by the 1939 Act 
On 6 August 1935, the Governor-General of South Africa appointed a 
Commission on Company Law to:  
‘(a) consider and report whether any, and if so what, amendments 
to the Companies Act, No 46 of 1926, are desirable in view of the 
altered conditions and financial practices since that date; and 
(b) draft the necessary legislation to give effect to any 
recommendations made.’ 
The Commission released its report in 1936. The report, Report of the 
Company Law Commission 1935 – 1936, was accompanied by a draft 
legislation.  
 In its report, the Commission highlighted the issue of conflict of 
interest with regard to directors’ interests in contracts with the 
company, which it suggested required the intervention of the 
Legislature. The Commission was of the view that a director’s action in 
making a contract with the company was, as a rule, fraught with very 
serious consequences. This envisaged a modification of the common law 
position on directors contracting with the company.  
The common law required directors to exercise their powers in 
good faith and for the benefit of the company only, and to avoid a 
conflict between their own interests and those of the company. A 
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director could not be relieved of this duty in the articles or in any other 
way. The company and its members found their best protection in the 
fiduciary duties imposed upon directors.79 
In relation to the duty to avoid a conflict of interests, a) a director 
could not obtain any advantage from his office other than that to which 
he was entitled, ie by way of remuneration, and b) as a rule he could 
only contract with the company with the approval of the company in a 
general meeting or be permitted by the articles to do so.80 The latter 
point was illustrated in Gundelfinger v African Textile Manufactures Ltd 
and Others.81 It was alleged in this case that the defendants as the 
directors of African Textiles voted at a meeting of board of directors for 
their own remuneration. Subsequently, the plaintiff requested the 
company to convene a general meeting of the shareholders at which he 
wanted to submit a resolution objecting to the payment and to request 
the company to oblige the directors to return the monies already paid to 
them. The general meeting of the shareholder rejected the plaintiff’s 
resolution, and instead adopted a resolution submitted by the impugned 
directors asking the meeting to approve, ratify and confirm the 
remuneration agreement made by the board. In this regard, the court 
said that it was an elementary principle of company law that, apart from 
an explicit power in the articles of association, a director could vote for 
the adoption of a contract on a matter in which he was an interested 
party.82 However, the court held that the contract was not void, but was 
voidable at the election of the company.83 
The 1939 Act did not modify these rigid and inflexible strictures of 
the common law on fiduciary duties of directors, except with regard to 
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whom to disclose the interest in a contract. It explicitly required a 
conflicted director to disclose his interest in a contract with the 
company to a meeting of other directors -  instead of the shareholders as 
had been the case in common law.   
Furthermore, the Commission observed that there was a tendency 
in the articles to relieve directors of liability for their fiduciary duties to 
the company. It proposed that a provision be made in legislation voiding 
such exemptions. The legislative intervention in this regard was section 
70sext which voided any provision in the articles or in any contract with 
a company exempting any director or manager or officer from any 
liability which would attach to such director for negligence, default or 
breach of duty or trust. The recommendation of the Commission in this 
regard followed a similar provision, namely section 152 of the British 
Companies Act of 1929.   
2.1 Director’s Interests in Contracts with the Company  
The Commission reported that it heard evidence that there were many 
instances in which memoranda or articles of companies contained 
provisions which expressly permitted a director to be interested in a 
contract with the company, and mostly importantly, purport to relieve 
the director from any obligation to disclose any such interest or to 
account in any way to the company.84 To aggravate the situation, the 
memoranda or articles would further disentitle any member of the 
company from impugning the conduct of the director in regard to such a 
contract.85 The Commission took the view that it would not be practical 
or desirable to absolutely prohibit a director from being interested in a 
contract or proposed contract with the company, but there should be 
explicit provisions in legislation prohibiting any such freedom from 
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disclosure by memoranda or articles.86 It stated that such a disclosure 
of interests should be made to a meeting of directors.87 
 The proposed changes were effected under section 70quin of the 
Act. Subsection (1) imposed a general duty on a director of a company 
who was in anyway, directly or indirectly, interested in a contract or 
proposed contract with the company to declare the nature and extent of 
his interests to a meeting of the directors of the company as prescribed 
by the section. The ambit and scope of the nature and extent of the 
interest to be disclosed was dealt with in S v Heller and Another.88 Trollip 
J said: 
‘According to the common law, section 70quin (1) of the Companies 
Act, and the articles of the companies concerned (exhs 201 to 205), 
a director must disclose the nature of his interest in any 
transaction with the company. That certainly includes revealing his 
identity in the transaction as vendor or otherwise. He must also 
disclose the fact and extent of his profit. According to the common 
law, material facts relating to the nature of his interest must 
ordinarily be disclosed, … Consequently, where the transaction is 
one of selling things to the company it would normally be the duty 
of the director to disclose the exact extent of the profit which he will 
make as a result of the transaction, as that would be a material fact 
in the above sense, especially if the actual value of the property was 
not readily or easily determinable. The director’s duty of declaring 
‘nature of his interest’ would therefore include making that 
disclosure in such a transaction.’ 
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A director was therefore required to reveal or disclose the material facts 
relating to the nature of his interest in a transaction. The material facts 
included the following: 
• the nature of his interest in any transaction with the company; 
• his identity in the transaction, ie the capacity in which he was a 
party to the transaction, for example, whether he was the seller or 
purchaser; 
• the fact and extent of the profit that the director would make; this 
could require disclosure of the purchase price of the goods sold to 
the company; and 
• any commission that the director would receive as a result of the 
contract being concluded with the company.89 
The word ‘interest’ was found to have a very wide meaning in 
Stellenbosch Farmers’ Winery Ltd v Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd and 
Another.90 The court defined ‘interest’ in business as follows: 
‘In my opinion “interest” means financial or pecuniary interest, 
the interest of a person who has some share or participation in 
either profits or losses, or in both the profits and losses of the 
business, or in the takings or sales of the business.’91 
A director will therefore have an interest in a contract if he is a party to 
the contract, or has a pecuniary share or stake in the conclusion or 
outcome of the contract, or a claim upon anything in terms of the 
contract, or if he is concerned or affected in respect of any advantage or 
detriment flowing from the contract; in other words, if he has some 
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share or participation in either the profits or losses resulting from the 
contract.  
Subsection (2) stipulated that in the case of a proposed contract, 
the declaration must be made at the meeting of directors at which the 
question of entering into the contract was first taken into consideration 
or if the director only became interested after such meeting, then he had 
to make his declaration at the next meeting held after he became 
interested. In the case where the director became interested in a 
contract after it has been made, he had to declare his interest at the 
next meeting after his acquisition of an interest. 
 Subsection (3) provided that for purposes of complying with 
subsections (1) and (2) a general notice given to the directors of a 
company by a director to the effect that he was a member of a specified 
company or firm, as such, he was to be regarded as interested in any 
contract with that company or firm which may be entered into after the 
date of such notice, and that that notice was to be deemed as a 
sufficient declaration of interest to any contract made with that 
company or firm.  
Furthermore, subsection (4) required that the notice convening 
the meeting where the contract or proposed contract in which the 
director, directly or indirectly, was interested was to be placed before the 
company for authorisation or confirmation had to include information 
on the nature and extent of the interest the director had in such a 
contract. 
 Lastly, subsection (5) stipulated that section 70quin did not 
prejudice the operation of any rule of law which restricted directors of a 
company from being interested in contracts with the company. Its effect 
was that if the articles prohibited a director from contracting with the 
company and he failed to comply with them, the use of the disclosure 
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requirements of the 1939 Act would not be a defence for the director 
from being held liable in common law for breach of duty.   
 In Rex v Milne and Erleigh92, the court was asked to decide 
whether the directors had a duty to disclose their interests in a 
proposed contract when a decision on the contract was not to be made 
at a meeting of directors. The accused had a controlling interest in the 
company and were its joint managing directors. The board gave them, 
through its articles, unlimited authority to deal in shares on behalf of 
the company and its group of companies at their own discretion. The 
contracts in which it was alleged that they were interested were never 
considered by a meeting of the board of directors and the question that 
arose was whether section 70quin made it an offence for a director not 
disclose his interest in a contract which was not entered into on the 
authority of a resolution adopted at a meeting of the directors. The court 
held that it was clear that subsection (2) dealt with, among others, with 
the case where the question of entering into a proposed contract was 
taken into consideration at a meeting of directors. On the wording of the 
subsection, there was no obligation on a director to disclose his interest 
in a proposed contract unless the question of entering into that contract 
was to be taken into consideration at a meeting of directors.  
 In the view of the court the obligation to disclose arose only at the 
meeting of directors at which the question of entering into the contract 
was considered. For example, a director may be interested in a proposed 
contract and shortly afterwards a meeting of directors may be held at 
which the question of entering into the contract was not taken into 
consideration, in that case the court said there would be no obligation 
on the director concerned to disclose his interest. In other words, the 
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obligation to disclose only arose at the meeting of directors at which the 
question of entering into the contract was considered. 
 As the section made no mention of contracts which did not require 
the authorisation of directors’ meeting, the court said the following 
classes of contracts fell outside the ambit of the section: 
• contracts concluded by company’s officers; 
• contracts concluded by a managing director or other directors who 
had been empowered by the board to enter into such contracts; 
• contracts entered into by the authority of a written resolution 
signed by the directors in terms of any article authorising the 
passing of a resolution in that manner. 
In the course of the judgement, the court pointed out that on its 
construction of section 70quin the salutary provisions of the section 
could easily be evaded by unscrupulous directors when the articles 
empowered them to delegate to one of their own wide powers as a 
managing director to enter into contracts on behalf of the company or 
when the articles provided that a written resolution signed by the 
directors should be as effectual as if it had been passed at a meeting of 
directors.93 
 The loopholes identified by the court in Milne and Erleigh were 
closed by the revised wording of section 70quin, which was proposed by 
the Company Law Amendment Enquiry Commission 1947 – 1948.  
3. Reform of the common law fiduciary duties by the 1952 Act 
The Companies Amendment Act (Act No 46 of 1952) (the 1952 Act), 
which came into effect on 1 January 1953, was the outcome of the 
recommendations of the Company Law Amendment Enquiry 
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Commission. The Commission was appointed by the Governor-General 
on 19 September 1947 with the following mandate: 
(1) To consider what major amendments were required in the law 
relating to the constitution, incorporation, registration, 
management, administration and winding-up of companies and 
other associations and matters incidental thereto, having regard in 
particular to: 
a. the requirements relating to the formation and the conduct 
of  companies; 
b. the safeguards afforded for investors and the public 
interests; 
c. the recommendations of the Commission appointed by the 
Board of Trade in England on the 26th  June, 1943, in order 
to consider; and 
d. report what major amendments were desirable in the 
English Companies Act, 1929, together with any legislation 
that has been drafted as a result of the said 
recommendations. 
(2) To submit a draft Bill for the purpose of giving effect to any 
recommendations that may be made for the amendment of the 
present law.94 
The Commission submitted its final report in September 1948, which 
was accompanied by a draft Bill.  In its report, the Commission 
recommended the adoption of many of the leading features of the 
English Act of 1947.95 The terms of reference of the Commission were 
almost the same as those of the Cohen Committee appointed on 20 June 
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1943 by the President of the Board of Trade in the United Kingdom, 
which was tasked to enquire on what changes were required to be made 
to the British Companies Act of 1929. The Committee appointed by the 
President of the British Board of Trade was referred to as the Cohen 
Committee and its report as the Cohen Report after its Chairman, Sir 
Lionel Leonard Cohen, at the time a Judge of the Chancery Division and 
later one of the Lord Justices of the Court of Appeal.96 
 The Commission was enjoined by its terms of reference to have 
regard to the recommendations of the Cohen Committee and to the 
resulting legislation in Britain. Consequently, the Commission was 
largely concerned with the question of how far these new provisions in 
the British Companies Act of 1947 could be usefully adopted in our 
legislation.  
 One of the observations made by the Cohen Report, with which 
the Commission agreed, was that company law as it existed was not 
adequate to the needs of the times. It found that the law was deficient in 
that it proceeded on the democratic principle that a company is subject 
to the control of its members. But, at that time already, capital had 
become so dispersed among a multitude of small shareholders that 
management was divorced from ownership and the control of 
shareholders had become illusory.97 A key feature of the British Act of 
1947 was that it went a long way towards remedying the state of affairs 
then existing.98 It provided improved mechanism to enable shareholders 
to influence the management of their companies and to impose duties 
on directors to disclose information about their conduct in the company 
affairs, which in the past the law permitted them to withhold.  
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 Whilst the Commission recommended in its report the adoption of 
many of the leading features of the British Act of 1947, it did not by any 
means recommend everything in the Act as suitable to the conditions of 
South Africa.99 
3.1 Directors’ Interests in Contracts with the Company  
The Commission reiterated that it was evident that a director’s 
participation in a contract with the company was, as a rule, fraught with 
risks for the company. In the common law, there was at once a conflict 
of interests between a director’s duty to the company and his private 
interests. If he made a profit, he forfeited it to the company.100 These 
consequences do not follow, however, where the articles expressly 
provided for a director to contract with the company, but provided he 
fully disclosed his interest in the contract to the company. In terms of 
the 1939 Act, the disclosure had to be made to a meeting of directors; 
not to the shareholders of the company. The 1952 Act stipulated in great 
detail the disclosure requirements that had to be met by directors 
seeking to contract with the company.   
 Section 70quin of the Act which had imposed a duty on directors 
to disclose to their boards their interests in contracts with the company 
was replaced by a new section.101 It imposed a duty on a director who 
was in any way, directly or indirectly, interested in a contract or 
proposed contract with the company, to disclose the nature and extent 
of his interest at the meeting of the directors of the company.102 
 Firstly, the duty to disclose was imposed with regard to any 
contract entered into or proposed to be entered into: 
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• following a resolution taken or to be taken at a meeting of 
directors;  
• following a written resolution signed or to be signed by the 
directors; or 
• by a director or manager who, either by himself or with others, 
has been authorised by the board of directors to enter into the 
contract or a contract of that nature.  
The declaration that was to be made by the director was to be made in 
the case of: 
• a contract for which confirmation or authorisation was required at 
a directors’ meeting, at that particular meeting, or if the directors’ 
interest only arose at a later date, at the next meeting after such 
interest was acquired, and if disclosure was for any reason not 
possible at either meeting, then at the first possible meeting 
thereafter;103 
• a contract for which confirmation or authorisation was required 
by written resolution, by means of a written notice given to the 
other directors at the time when the director interested in the 
contract heard of the proposed resolution concerning the 
contract;104 
• a contract or proposed contract entered into by a director or 
manager of the company authorised by the board of directors to 
do so, the declaration must be made at the first meeting after the 
director became aware of such a contract or interested in it, and if 
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it was a proposed contract, by written notice to the director or 
manager authorised to enter into such a contract.105 
• all other contracts, or where the interest arose after the contract 
was made, at the first meeting after the director became interested 
at which it is possible for him to attend.106 
A general notice given by the director to the other directors of the 
company, to the effect that he was interested in all contracts made with 
a specified company or firm, was deemed to be a sufficient declaration of 
interests and compliant with the provisions of the section 70quin, if the 
following requirements were fulfilled: 
• the nature and extent of the interest the director had in the firm 
or company was stated;107 
• the extent of the interest at the time when the confirmation of the 
contract was considered was not greater than that stated in the 
notice;108 
• the notice was given at a meeting of the directors or the director 
had taken care to see to it that it was brought up and read at the 
first meeting of the board held after it was given;109 
• where the contract was made by a manager authorised to make 
such contract, the director giving such notice must have taken all 
reasonable care to see to it that it was brought to the notice of the 
manager;110 and 
• a general notice to be effective was to be renewed every year.  
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Non-compliance with the provisions of section 70quin was made an 
offence.  
 Lastly, the Act expressly provided that the requirements imposed 
by it were not intended to prejudice or to nullify the operation of any 
rule of law restricting directors of a company from having an interest in 
contracts with the company.111 The rule of law referred to related to the 
right of the company to avoid the contract. It has been held that a 
contract between a director and his company or a company in which he 
was interested, was voidable at the instance of the company unless 
sanctioned by the articles and in compliance with their requirements.112 
4. Conclusion 
The fiduciary duties imposed on directors by the common law remained 
in force after the 1926 Act. The Act did not modify or alter them. The 
legal position remained that directors stood in a fiduciary relationship to 
the company, which required them to act in good faith and to avoid a 
conflict of interest between their personal interests and those of the 
company.113 
 The Commission appointed by the government in 1935 noted a 
tendency in the articles to relieve directors of their liability to their 
company for breach of their duty or where they were conflicted. The 
Legislature intervened in this regard and made a significant change with 
respect to the duties of directors.114 It retained the common law position 
on the fiduciary duties of directors, except that it required a director 
who was tainted with a conflict of interest to disclose his interest to the 
other directors.  
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 Further changes to the duties of directors were effected through 
the 1952 Act.115 The changes introduced detailed disclosure 
requirements that directors seeking to contract with the companies had 
to comply with. This was in light of the loopholes highlighted in the 

















                                           




Directors’ Fiduciary Duties after the 1973 Act 
1. Introduction 
On 14 October 1963, the President of the Republic of South Africa 
appointed the Commission of Enquiry into the 1926 Companies Act (the 
Commission).116 Its terms of reference required it to investigate and 
consider, amongst others, the protection afforded to investors and the 
public interest by the 1926 Act. 
Until the enactment of the Act, it was general legislative policy to 
follow English company law. In this regard, the Main Report of the 
Commission said:  
‘In considering the Companies Act as a whole and in analysing 
certain specific provisions which have either given rise to difficulties 
in South Africa or which have proved to be ineffective, it has become 
clear that the 1909 Transvaal Act had been enacted with scant 
regard to the differences between the South African Common Law 
and the British Common Law. Some of these questionable provisions 
were perpetuated in the 1926 Companies Act’.117 
The Report stated that ‘the time has passed that South Africa can 
simply rewrite into its own legislation what it finds in the corresponding 
English legislations’.118 The two previous Commissions, namely the 
Lansdowne and Millin Commissions, were required by their terms of 
reference to model the company law on that of England. The approach of 
the Commission marked a significant departure in this respect from its 
predecessors. It sought to ensure that any adaptation of the English law 
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would be compatible with the South African law. This was, however, not 
a unanimous position.  Advocate Arthur Suzman, one of the 
Commissioners, disagreed with this approach in his Reservations.119  In 
his view, any differences between the respective law of England and 
South Africa were minimal, and in the sphere of international trade and 
commerce there was a clear and obvious advantage in having like 
legislation. 
As with the Company Law Amendment Enquiry Commission (the 
Millin Commission), the Commission dealt, inter alia, with the duties of 
directors with regard to directors’ interests in contracts with the 
company. 
2. Directors’ Interests in Contracts with the Company 
In common law, the fiduciary duties required a director to disclose his 
interest in a contract with the company to the members in general 
meeting.120 Failure to disclose the interest may result in the contract 
being voidable. The voidability of the contract could be overcome by 
either permitting a contract between a director and the company in the 
articles or obtaining the approval of the contract at a general meeting of 
the members after full disclosure. The requirement that the disclosure 
should be made to members in a general meeting was changed by the 
Lansdowne Commission. It permitted a disclosure to be made to the 
board.  
The Commission heard evidence that section 70quin was 
unsatisfactory and had serious deficiencies. Witnesses who appeared 
before the Commission alleged that the section was burdensome and 
imposed considerable administrative duties on companies and in the 
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process destroyed most of its value. They urged that it be scrapped.121 
The Commission felt that such suggestions were too drastic. It said that 
the fiduciary duties of directors and their implications in the event of a 
conflict of interest between a director and the company, as regulated by 
the common law, were well known.122 The Commission, therefore, 
retained the position unaltered, except to propose new measures to 
ensure better compliance and protection of shareholders.  
With regard to the principles enunciated by section 70quin, the 
Commission noted that the section covered the following principles:  
• whenever an interest existed, it had to be disclosed; 
• it was the duty of the director who had an interest to declare that 
interest; 
• the declaration of the interest was to be made to the other 
directors; 
• the other directors, by implication had the duty to examine the 
declared interest and determine the interests of the company in 
relation to it; and  
• the contracts or proposed contracts were contracts of substance 
requiring the authority of the board.123 
The Commission was, however, critical of subsections (5) and (9). 
Subsection (9) required the general notice, which had to be in writing, to 
be given once a year. It found that it was common for the notices to 
contain long lists of directorships and shareholdings of the directors in 
other companies. The notices were deemed to be sufficient declarations 
of interests in relation to future contracts with those companies, and no 
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further reference to a director’s interest was required when such 
contracts were considered. The Commission held that it was virtually 
impossible for a director to remember every detail of all the general 
notices given by all its co-directors. It was not unlikely that contracts 
could thus be considered and authorised by boards which were unaware 
of the interest of a director while there was a technical compliance with 
the requirements of the law.124 
 Subsection 9 was also severely criticised with regard to disclosure 
to members. The declaration to members had to be done by way of a 
return, which had to be placed before the annual general meeting. 
However, a company could by a special resolution waive that 
requirement. The Commission noted that the return reflected contracts 
in respect of which declarations of interests were made under 
subsection (3). However, it listed contracts in respect of which the 
interest of a director had been disclosed in the manner prescribed by 
subsection (5). In practice, the contracts and declarations made under 
subsection (3) were found in the minutes of the meetings of directors. In 
the case of subsection (5), the contracts were also found in the minutes 
of directors but the declaration or disclosure of interest was contained in 
the general notice given by a director.  
 The evidence led at the Commission was to the effect that the 
inspection of the return at the annual general meeting was 
impracticable and that the subsection failed on that account. Lastly, it 
had become the general practice to waive the requirement by passing 
the special resolution. The net effect was that there was in practice no 
proper disclosure to members of contracts in respect of which directors 
had declared interests. The information about such contracts could not 
be obtained by members unless voluntarily given by the company.125 If 
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the special resolution had been passed, the administration of the 
company need not prepare the return provided by subsection (9). 
Although the Commission concluded that the subsection was ineffective, 
it subscribed to the principle that members of companies were entitled 
to a full and transparent accounting by the directors in regard to 
transactions where conflict between duty and interest may have existed. 
The recommendations of the Commission were encapsulated in sections 
234 to 241 of the Act. 
 Gower gave the following underlying reasons for a similar legislative 
intervention by England in 1929: 
‘Contracts with directors, such as service agreements, became 
increasingly common, and contracts in which the directors were 
interested, for example as directors of another company, more 
common still. And the directors were unwilling to suffer the delay, 
embarrassment and possible frustration entailed by having to 
submit all such contracts to the company in general meetings. 
But just as the normal restraints on trustees can be modified by 
express provisions in the will or deed under which they are 
appointed, so (within limits) can the normal fiduciary duties of 
directors be modified by express provisions in the company’s 
constitution. Such provisions have become common-form in the 
articles of registered companies’.126 
Developments in South Africa had been along the same lines. That 
emerged clearly in the Report of the Lansdowne Commission in the 
1930s: 
‘Instances have been brought to our notice in which ... articles of 
association have contained provisions expressly permitting any 
director to be interested in a contract with a company otherwise 
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than as a member of the company, and by purporting expressly to 
relieve such a director from any obligation to disclose any such 
interest or to account for same in any way to the company and to 
disentitle any member of the company from impugning the 
conduct of any such director in that regard. We recognise that it 
would not be practicable absolutely to prohibit a director from 
having any interest in a contract or proposed contract with his 
company, but there should be explicit provision forbidding any 
such freedom from disclosure as the  ... articles to which reference 
has been made purport to convey’.127 
In order to prevent articles of association from being too generous in this 
regard, sections 234 – 241 of the Act were promulgated. The sections 
were designed to compel directors to disclose any personal interests in 
contracts with the company.128 These provisions did not override or 
substitute the common law rule that where a director had a direct or 
indirect interest in a contract of the company and failed to disclose it, 
the contract was voidable at the election of the company. The purpose of 
the provisions was to lay down minimum disclosure requirements; in 
other words, articles of the company could not lay down less stringent 
disclosure requirements than those stipulated by the Act. The sections 
did not say that if they were complied with, the contract in question 
could not be impeached. If the articles of the company did not permit a 
director to have a personal interest in contracts of the company, the 
common law rule would remain applicable, namely that the contract 
would be voidable at the company’s election.129 
 On the other hand, if the articles of a company gave a director 
permission to have an interest in a contract with the company, such a 
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contract was valid.130 But the Act still required a director to make a 
disclosure as prescribed by sections 234 – 241, and if he failed to do so, 
he would lose the protection afforded to him by the articles. The 
consequence of non-disclosure was that he could be made to pay any 
profits obtained from the contract over to the company.131 Moreover, the 
failure to make disclosure as required by the Act was a criminal 
offence.132 
2.1 Content of Sections 234 – 241 of the 1973 Act 
The effect of section 234(2) was that the duty to disclose interests of 
directors in contracts with the company applied to contracts that were: 
• of significance in relation to the company’s business; and  
• were entered into - 
o following a directors’ resolution; or  
o by a director or officer duly authorised by the directors to 
enter into such contracts.133 
 The Act required a director who was in any way materially interested, 
directly or indirectly, in a contract or proposed contract with the 
company, or who became interested in such a contract after it had been 
concluded, to disclose his interest and full particulars to a board 
meeting.134 It further required that the disclosure of interest be made in 
the manner prescribed by the Act. The qualification that the interest had 
to be material represented a departure from section 70quin of the 1926 
Act.  
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 The manner and time of disclosure was prescribed by section 235. 
Firstly, it stipulated that a disclosure must be made at or before the 
meeting of directors at which the entering into or confirmation of the 
contract was to be first considered.135 If the disclosure was in writing, it 
had to be read out to the meeting or each director present had to state 
in writing that he had read it.136 Secondly, if, for any reason, it was 
impossible for a director to make a disclosure at or before a particular 
meeting, he could make it at the first subsequent meeting at which it 
was possible to do so and state the reason why he could not make the 
disclosure at the relevant meeting.137 The declaration could be made 
orally or in writing.138 One of the ways in which it could be made was by 
way of tacit assent to assertions made in a meeting. 139 In Novick, the 
applicant had kept silent at the board meeting, however, others had 
disclosed his interest in a contract with the company. Coleman J said 
there was: 
‘substance in the contention … that an audible utterance of the 
relevant facts by (N) was not the only way in which the disclosure 
could be made. One of the ways in which it could be made, it was 
argued, was (N’s) tacit assent to and adoption of the assertion made 
to the meeting by others’ 
The articles sometimes permit directors to act, instead of a meeting, by 
way of a written resolution signed by the directors, the so-called ‘round 
robin’. In terms of s 236, for such a written resolution to be valid, the 
provisions of sections 234 and 235 had to be complied with.  
 A director could find that he was a member of a company or firm 
which contracted with the company regularly. To avoid repeated and 
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identical disclosures, the Act provided for a general written notice to the 
effect that the interested director was a member of the company or firm 
and was to be regarded as interested in its contracts.140 The general 
notice had to indicate the nature and extent of the interest in the other 
company or firm. It had also to be updated whenever circumstances had 
changed. Because the general notice expired at the end of the financial 
year, it had to be renewed yearly.  
 Section 237 dealt with a director or officer who had been authorised 
by the directors to contract for the company, but was materially 
interested in the contract he was supposed to conclude for the company. 
Such a director was required to disclose his interests and full 
particulars as required by section 235 before he entered into it.141 
Furthermore, the director was prohibited from entering into the 
proposed contract until the board had approved the proposed contract 
by way of a resolution. However, if the director became interested in a 
contract after it had been concluded, he had to declare his interest, not 
as prescribed by section 235, but by a written notice to the directors.142 
 The Act required that any notice convening a meeting to confirm a 
contract in which a director was interested had to state the full 
particulars of the interest.143 This requirement also applied to cases 
where articles did not provide for directors to be interested in a contract 
with the company or permission was subject to the approval of the 
general meeting.  
 Section 239 required any declaration of interest to be recorded in 
the minutes of the meeting at which the declaration was made. It also 
required that where a declaration was made in writing and the copies of 
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the minutes at which the declaration was made were not circulated to 
the directors, the minutes recording the declaration had to be read out 
at the first subsequent meeting.144 The purpose of the provision was to 
acquaint directors who were absent from the meeting with the content of 
the disclosure.  
 In terms of section 240, every company had to keep a register of 
interests in contracts with the company at registered offices, which had 
to be open to public inspection. Furthermore, the auditor had the duty 
to satisfy himself that the minutes reflecting the disclosures and the 
register of interests in contracts were done properly.145 
    These provisions showed the importance that the legislature 
attached to the principle that a company should be protected against a 
director who had a conflict of interest and duty.146 Their purpose was to 
ensure that the interest of any director in any actual or proposed 
contract was made an item of business at a meeting of directors.147 
4. Conclusion 
The Act did not alter the position of the common law with regard to the 
interests of directors in contracts with the company. The position was 
still that directors must either be permitted by the articles or a 
resolution of the company in a general meeting to enter into such 
contract. If they failed to disclose their interests, the contract was 
voidable. However, the Act imposed minimum disclosure requirements 
that directors had to comply with, which could not be varied downward 
by the articles by means of less stringent requirements.148 
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The Act required that the interest of the director that had to be 
disclosed had to be a material interest and of significance in relation to 
the business of the company. The interests had be declared to a meeting 
of the board or made an item of business of a board meeting. The Act 
also provided for the avoidance of the need for repeated disclosures of a 
director’s interests in a company which the company dealt with 
regularly.  To that effect, it provided for a general written notice to be 
submitted to the board which indicated the nature and extent of the 
interest in the other company.149 
Furthermore, the Act still retained the importance of informing 
members about the interests of directors in contracts with the company. 
It required every company to keep a register of interests in contract with 












                                           





 The 2008 Companies Act 
1. Introduction 
The 1973 Companies Act largely left to the common law and the Codes 
of Corporate Governance the regulation of the fiduciary duties of 
directors.150In the 1990s, a number of academic writers on company law 
began to argue that company law needed a comprehensive review to deal 
with such matters.151 This was much so after the advent of a new 
constitutional and democratic dispensation in 1994, which created new 
demands on companies, such as employment equity and black 
empowerment. It was also notable that three decades had passed since 
the last review of company law. On 11 and 12 July 2003 the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) officially launched a new 
company law reform process at the Local and International Roundtable 
on Company Law Reform in Johannesburg.152 
 The DTI informed the Roundtable that the first step of the reform 
process would be the production and publication of a document setting 
out the guidelines for corporate law reform. The guidelines were also to 
serve as drafting instructions for the chief drafter of the envisaged 
Act.153 One area on which the Roundtable agreed, which required an 
overhaul was corporate governance. In the aftermath of the global 
corporate collapses and failures of corporate governance systems which 
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had occurred at the time of the Roundtable, domestically and 
internationally, the discussion on this area focussed on the need to 
improve corporate governance and the desirability of adopting a general 
statement on the duties of directors and their liability.154 
 The Roundtable was followed by the process of drafting the 
guidelines which, amongst others, acknowledged the following 
principles:  
• company law should primarily govern the relationship 
between corporate managers (directors and officers), 
shareholders and, where appropriate, relevant stakeholders; 
• the business and affairs of the company had to be managed 
under the direction of the board of directors;  
• the board was to be invested with sufficient discretion to 
make business decisions and a wide choice of means to 
effect those decisions, subject to the limitations generally 
acceptable in corporate law; 
• with the discretion afforded to directors, the company law 
was to be alive to the danger of possible abuse of powers by 
directors, and as a result, should deploy means to prevent 
and remedy disloyalty;  
• safeguards should include (a) a general statement of the 
minimum duties of directors in a statutory form, (b) the 
mandatory annual election of directors, (c) and the 
identification of certain transactions that may not be 
implemented by the directors without shareholder approval. 
In May 2004, the DTI released the Policy Framework for Company Law 
Reform, entitled ‘South African Company Law for the 21st Century: 
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Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform’.155 The objective of the policy 
framework was to guide the law reform process. After its publication, the 
DTI held public consultations in all nine provinces from 24 June to 23 
September 2004. Simultaneously, the department submitted the policy 
framework to the National Development and Labour Council’s (Nedlac) 
Trade and Industry Chamber as required by the Nedlac Act.156 
 After the consultations on the policy framework had been 
completed, the department revised the guidelines with a view to prepare 
the drafter’s instructions. After the drafting had been completed, the 
draft Bill was submitted to Cabinet for approval.  
 The Companies Bill was tabled in Parliament in June 2008 and 
referred to the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry for processing 
on behalf of the National Assembly. The Committee held its own public 
hearings on the Bill. The Bill was passed by Parliament on 19 November 
2008, with minor amendments.157 The Bill was signed into law by the 
President on 8 April 2009.  
2. The Policy Framework Proposals 
The policy guidelines noted that there had been no comprehensive 
reform of company law undertaken by South Africa since the 
investigation of company law by the Van Wyk De Vries Commission.158 
The stated objective of the latest reform was to ensure that a new 
legislation was appropriate to the legal, economic and social context of 
South Africa as a constitutional democracy and an open economy. 
Professor Havenga stated that far-reaching changes had occurred since 
the previous revision which had culminated in the 1973 Companies 
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Act.159 An important factor in the changed circumstances was the new 
Constitution and related legislation, which promoted its objectives and 
provisions, such as the Promotion of Access to Information Act of 2000 
and the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act of 
2003.160Professor Havenga said that company law should reflect the 
fundamental changes that have occurred since the last company law 
review. 
The guidelines stated that it was important that rules governing the 
conduct of directors in South Africa were clarified.161 It reaffirmed that 
directors’ duties play a significant role in ensuring good corporate 
governance. However, the legal principles governing these duties were all 
found in common law, specifically in case law that dated back to the 
early eighteenth century. They were therefore not easily accessible to 
directors. The guidelines argued that there was merit in the view that 
the new Act should contain a statutory standard of directors’ duties. A 
statutory standard of conduct and a clear statement of duties would 
assist in capturing the legal principles and give the directors a degree of 
certainty about their duties, the standard of their conduct and 
associated liabilities.162 
 Furthermore, the guidelines suggested a possible set of duties and 
standards of conduct, which were the duty of fair dealing and care, and 
the duty to act in the interests of the company. It proposed that 
directors should have an obligation to disclose to the company any 
business opportunity that comes to the director if the director had a 
reasonable belief that the company would be interested in the 
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opportunity, as well as the duty to disclose relevant material information 
not known to other directors.  
3. The 2008 Companies Act  
The Act inaugurated a radical departure from previous company 
legislation, by partially codifying the fiduciary duties of directors. Under 
it, the fiduciary duties of directors are mandatory, prescriptive and 
unalterable, and apply to all companies. The stated objective of the 
codification is to make the law clearer and accessible, particularly to 
directors.163 The codified duties are best understood in the context of the 
common law which has governed corporate conduct for over a hundred 
years. 
In common law, directors have a fiduciary duty to avoid a conflict of 
interest between their interests and their duty to the company. The Act 
preserves and codifies this common law rule on conflict of interest.164 
However, it does not repeal the common law which remains applicable to 
the extent that it is not in conflict with the Act. When determining a 
matter before it in terms of the Act, a court will have regard to the 
common law.165 The no-conflict rule is encapsulated in section 76(2) of 
the Act, which provides that directors must not use their office or any 
information obtained while in the capacity of director to: 
• gain an advantage for the director, or for another person other 
than the company or a wholly owned subsidiary of the company; 
or  
• knowingly cause harm to the company or a subsidiary of the 
company.166 
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According to Cassim, the section is wide enough to include the duty to 
avoid a conflict of interest and duty.167 It is aimed at deterring directors 
from using their position for personal gain while in the capacity of 
directorship. It would also deter directors from engaging in self-dealing. 
The rule against self-dealing requires directors not act on behalf of the 
company in a matter in which they have an interest.168 The rule is 
applied strictly and inflexibly by the courts. However, there are 
exceptions. Directors will escape liability for contravening the rule if they 
obtain the consent of the company, after making a full disclosure.169 
Alternatively, they escape liability if the articles relax the rule by 
granting directors permission to enter into contracts with the company 
after disclosure to the board. If the directors declare their interests in a 
contract to the board, they have to ensure that they do so to an 
independent board.170 
4. Contracts with the Company 
The most obvious form of a conflict of interest situation is where a 
director has a material interest in a contract entered into by the 
company. The underlying principle behind the prohibition against self-
dealing is that it is untenable for a director to be simultaneously a seller 
and buyer or lender and debtor. In such a situation, a director has total 
control over both sides of the transaction, and a wide ability to misuse 
his powers.171 To deal with this situation, the Act provides for the 
disclosure of directors’ interests in transactions of the company to the 
board.  
 It imposes a duty on a director to disclose any personal financial 
interest that he or a related person may have or have in a transaction to 
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be considered by the board.172 Personal financial interest means a 
‘direct material interest of a person that is of a financial, monetary or 
economic nature or to which a monetary value may be 
attributed’.173However, an interest held by a director in a unit trust or 
collective investment scheme is excluded from the meaning of a personal 
financial interest unless he has a direct control over the investment 
decisions of the fund or investment. The financial interest of a director 
or a related person must be direct and material, ie it must be a 
significant financial interest and not an indirect and trivial interest. The 
provision does not apply to non-financial interest. Section 1 defines 
‘material’ thus: 
‘material’, when used as an adjective, means significant in the 
particular circumstances to a degree that is –  
a) of consequence in determining the matter; or 
b) might reasonably affect a person’s judgement or decision-
making in the matter. 
Although the Act requires the disclosure of direct material interests, 
indirect interests are also taken care of through the requirement that a 
director must disclose the interests of a related person who are known 
by the director to hold personal financial interests in a contract with the 
company.174 In relation to section 75, a ‘related person’ to the director 
has the meaning in section 1. A related person, when used in respect of 
two persons, means persons who are connected to one another in any 
manner contemplated in section 2(1)(a) to (c).175 Section 2(1)(a) provides 
that, for all purposes of the Act, an individual is related to another 
individual if they are –  
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(i) married, or live together in a relationship similar to 
marriage; or  
(ii) separated by no more than two degrees of natural or 
adopted consanguinity or affinity.  
Section 2(1)(b) provides that, for all purposes of the Act, an individual is 
related to a juristic person if the individual directly or indirectly controls 
the juristic person. Lastly, section 2(1)(c) provides that two juristic 
persons are related to one another if – 
(i) either of them directly or indirectly controls the other, or the 
business of the other; 
(ii) either is a subsidiary of the other; or 
(iii) a person directly or indirectly controls each of them, or the 
business of each of them. 
4.1 Interests in Future Contracts 
Section 75(5)(a) to (c) is triggered whenever a director or a related person  
(to the knowledge of the director) has a direct material financial interest 
in a matter to be considered by the board of directors. It requires that 
the interest and its general nature must be disclosed to the board before 
it is considered at the meeting. At the meeting, the director must 
disclose any material information relating to the matter that is known to 
the director, including any observations or pertinent insights relating to 
the matter if requested to do so by the other directors. If section 75(5) is 
complied with, and the board duly makes a decision, or approves the 
agreement or transaction, or if it is ratified by the ordinary resolution of 
the shareholders, the decision, agreement or transaction is valid despite 
any personal financial interest of a director or related person in it.176 
This implies that a contract which does not comply with section 75(5) is 
invalid. 
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  However, if a director fails to declare his interest in a transaction a 
court may, on an application by an interested person, declare the 
transaction or agreement approved by the board valid despite the 
director’s failure to disclose his interests.  
 In common law, where a conflicted director contracted with his 
company, the contract was voidable at the election of the company.177 
He was liable to account to the company for any profits he made on the 
contract, unless the contract had been approved or ratified by the 
shareholders. The principle that a conflicted contract is voidable at the 
option of the company seems to be modified by the principle that the 
contract is not valid if the statutory requirements have not been 
complied with.  
4.2 A Disclosure and Recuse approach 
After making a full disclosure, the director, if present at the meeting, 
must leave it and may not take part in the consideration of the matter, 
except to disclose any material information and any observation or 
pertinent insights with regard to the matter.178 It is thus clear that a 
director who has a personal financial interest in a matter is prohibited 
from participating and voting on the matter at a board meeting. There 
are no exceptions to the prohibition. The director’s departure from the 
meeting does not affect the quorum for the meeting. These provisions 
embody the new ‘disclose and recuse’ approach of the Act.179 
Furthermore, the director is prohibited from executing any document on 
behalf of the company in respect of the matter unless he is specifically 
requested to do so by the board.180 
4.3 Interests in Existing Contracts 
                                           
177 Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 AD 168 
178 Section 75(5)(d) and (e) 
179 Farouk HI Cassim The Duties and the Liability of Directors, p 571 
180 Section 75(5)(g) 
69 
 
Section 75(6) regulates the situation where a director or a related person 
acquires a personal financial interest in a matter which the board has 
already approved. It stipulates that where a director or related person 
acquires a financial interest after the board has approved a matter, he 
must promptly disclose to the board or the shareholders the nature and 
extent of the interest and the material circumstances relating to its 
acquisition.181 
4.4 An Advance General Disclosure 
The Act provides for a general disclosure in advance by way of a general 
notice or standing notice.182 It requires a director at any time to deliver 
to the board a general notice or standing notice in writing stating the 
nature and extent of his financial interest in any company which may 
transact with the company. The general notice may be used generally for 
the purpose of section 75. It has the effect of facilitating the prior 
disclosure of personal financial interest. It is the equivalent of section 
243(3) of the 1973 Companies Act.  
3.5 Exemptions from the Disclosure Requirements 
Directors are exempted from the requirements of disclosure of financial 
interests in certain limited circumstances.183 The exemptions are in 
respect of: 
• decisions generally affecting all the directors in their capacity 
as directors; 
• decisions that affect a class of persons of which a director is a 
member, unless the only members of the class are the director 
or persons related or inter-related to the director; 
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• a proposal to remove that director from office in terms of 
section 71; or 
•  single member companies where the sole securities holder is 
also the sole director of the company.  
Furthermore, section 75(3) prevents a person who is the only director of 
the company but is not the sole holder of all the beneficial interest of all 
the issued securities of the company to disclose to himself. It requires 
the disclosure of personal financial interests to be made to the 
shareholders of the company and their approval to be obtained by an 
ordinary resolution. Otherwise, such a director may not approve or enter 
into an agreement in which he or a related person has a financial 
interest or determine any other matter in which he or a related person 
has a personal financial interest. The provision seeks to ensure that a 
sole director does not abuse his powers where he has a financial interest 
in a matter. 
4.6 The Effect of Section 75 
A decision of the board or a transaction that has been approved by the 
board or ratified by shareholders by an ordinary resolution is valid 
despite any financial interest of a director or related person if it was 
approved after disclosure in the manner set out in section 75.184 
Furthermore, on application by an interested person, a court may 
declare valid a transaction that has been approved by the board despite 
the failure of a director or related persons to satisfy the disclosure 
requirements of section 75.185 As stated earlier, the provision that a 
court may declare a contract valid implies that the common law 
principle that such a contract is voidable at the election of the company 
has been modified. The effect of this provision is to protect the interest 
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of innocent third parties to the agreement who were unaware of the 
director’s interest in the transaction.186 
5. Conclusion 
The DTI policy framework had argued that there was merit in the new 
Act to contain a statement of directors’ duties. It said such a statutory 
standard of conduct and clear statement of duties would assist in 
capturing the legal principles and give legal certainty about duties of 
directors. The Act has given effect to that objective. This inaugurated a 
radical departure from all previous company law.  
With regard to a director’s interest in contracts with the company, 
the Act requires him or a related person to the director to disclose it to 
the board.187  An innovation of the Act is the requirement that the 
director must disclose to the board any material information in regard to 
the transaction that is known to the director, including any observations 
or pertinent insights relating to the transaction if asked by the board. 
Furthermore, after making a full disclosure the director must vacate the 
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In this final chapter the principles pertaining to the fiduciary obligations 
of directors as apparent from the previous chapters are summarized and 
certain conclusions drawn. Firstly, the fiduciary duties of directors as 
reflected in common law are examined. Secondly, the impact of company 
law legislation until the 1973 Companies Act is reviewed. Lastly, the 
implications of the partial codification of the fiduciary duties of directors 
with regard to the duty to avoid conflict of interests, especially with 
regard to self-dealing are examined. 
2. Fiduciary obligations of Directors in Common law 
In common law, directors of companies stand in a fiduciary relationship 
to their companies. In Robinson, Innes CJ defines a fiduciary 
relationship thus; ‘Where one man stands to another in a position of 
confidence involving a duty to protect the interests of the other ’.188 The 
relationship imposes on directors a duty to act in good faith towards the 
company, exercise their powers in its best interests and avoid a conflict 
between their own interests and their duty to the company.189 
 Two characteristics are therefore essential to prove the existence 
of a fiduciary relationship. Firstly, the fiduciary should have scope to 
exercise a discretion or power. Secondly, the fiduciary must be able to 
unilaterally exercise the discretion or power in a way that affects the 
interests of the beneficiary in a legal and practical sense.190 The 
fiduciary obligation seeks to ensure that directors exercise the powers 
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entrusted upon them only for the benefit of the company, and never for 
their personal gain.191 
 Historically, our courts have often compared the position of 
directors to that of other fiduciaries. The most frequent comparison has 
been that between a director and a trustee, and between a director and 
an agent.192 These analogies do little more than prove the existence of a 
fiduciary duty. They do not determine the content of a director’s 
fiduciary obligation; neither do they prove the basis of his liability for its 
breaches. A director is neither a trustee nor an agent. His relationship 
with the company is unique, or sui generis.193 Consequently, specific 
legal principles and guidelines have been developed by the courts to 
regulate directors’ conduct.  
 The fiduciary duties of directors, broadly stated, require them to 
act in good faith and in the interests of the company, and that they 
should avoid a conflict of interests. The duties are not a closed list. A 
director may therefore not make secret profit from his position, other 
than as specified in the articles or a separate contract he had concluded 
with the company.194 
 It is necessary to retain a strict rule as a deterrent against the 
potential abuse by management of their privileged, often highly 
rewarded, position in the company. This is necessary because 
shareholders often find it difficult and costly to enforce their rights.  
3. Impact of Company Legislation until the 1973 Companies Act 
In common law directors had a duty to avoid placing themselves in a 
situation where their duties to the company conflict or may possibly 
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conflict with their personal interests. The general principle was that 
where a company enters into a contract in which a director has a 
personal interest the contract was not void but voidable at the election 
of the company. There were two important exceptions to this general 
rule. The first exception was that a director who breached his duty to 
avoid a conflict of interests may have it ratified by an ordinary resolution 
passed at a general meeting, after full disclosure.195 The effect of the 
company decision was to validate the contract against potential 
invalidity. The second exception was that company articles may permit 
directors to have interests in contracts entered into by the company. In 
this instance, the articles modified, in advance, the fiduciary duties of 
the directors.  
 When the 1926 Companies Act was enacted, it did not modify the 
common law on the fiduciary duties of directors.196 In its report, the 
Lansdowne Commission observed that a director’s action in entering 
into a contract with his company was, as a rule, fraught with very 
serious consequences, and that such conduct on the part of directors 
required to be regulated by the Legislature. It found that there was a 
tendency in the articles to relieve directors of liability of their fiduciary 
duties to their company. 
 Furthermore, the Commission found that the articles did not only 
permit directors to be interested in a contract with the company, but 
purported to relieve directors from any obligation to disclose any interest 
or to account in any way to the company.197 To aggravate the situation, 
the articles would disentitle any member of the company from 
challenging the conduct of the director with regard to the contract. The 
Commission took the view that it would not be practical or desirable to 
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absolutely prohibit a director from being interested in a contract with 
the company, but said that there should be an explicit provision in 
legislation prohibiting any freedom from disclosure in the articles.198 
However, such a disclosure was to be made to a meeting of the board of 
directors. The requirement for a disclosure to be made to the other 
directors was, in effect, a modification of the common law which had 
always required the disclosure to be made to the general meeting of the 
company.   
 The Millin Commission endorsed the view of the Lansdowne 
Commission that a director’s participation in a contract with the 
company was, as a rule, fraught with risks to the company. The 
Companies Amendment Act (No 46 of 1952), drafted by the Millin 
Commission, enacted in great detail the disclosure requirements that 
had to be complied with by directors seeking to contact with their 
companies.199 The Act expressly provided that the disclosure 
requirement imposed by it were not intended to prejudice or nullify the 
operation of any rule of law restricting directors from having interest in 
a contract with their company.200 
 The 1973 Companies Act retained the provisions relating to the 
disclosure requirements for directors interested in contracts with the 
company. It also retained the importance of informing members about 
the interests of directors in contracts with the company by requiring 
every company to keep a register of interests in contracts with the 
company at its registered office, which was open to the public for 
inspection.201 
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4. Implications of the Partial Codifications of Directors’ Duties 
The 2008 Companies Act inaugurated a radical departure from the 
previous company legislation by partially codifying the fiduciary duties 
of directors. It has made the fiduciary duties mandatory, prescriptive 
and unalterable. The Act preserves and codifies the common law rule on 
the conflict of interests by requiring directors to act in good faith and in 
the best interest of the company.202 
 In relation to contracts with the company, the Act introduces a 
new approach; the so-called disclose and recuse approach. Further, the 
Act stipulates that a decision of the board or a transaction that has been 
approved by the board or ratified by an ordinary resolution is valid 
despite any financial interest of a director or a related person if it was 
approved after disclosure as set out in section 75.203 Furthermore, on 
application by an interested person, a court may declare valid a 
transaction that has been approved by the board despite a failure by a 
director to satisfy the disclosure requirements of section 75. The effect of 
the provision that a court may declare a contract valid implies that the 
common law principle that such contracts are voidable at the election of 
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